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Hodgson is a scholar who has reflected a lifetime on the role, meaning and 
importance of  institutions in and for the economy. In turn, he has also created ‘In-
stitutions’. The time seems ripe to celebrate his work. In this review essay we will 
first attempt to summarize the chapters of  Institutions and Evolution of  Capitalism. 
Essays in Honour of  Geoffrey M. Hodgson, as well as to emphasize how the contribu-
tions to the book are situated in the vast horizon of  Hodgson’s thinking and/or 
how contributors engage with it. We will then hazard a few conclusive reflections 
drawing inspiration from Hodgson’s remarks in the final chapter, where he links 
the problematic economic conceptions of  man to rule-following behavior, as well 
as the problem of  moral, legal and political obligation, and discusses the future of  
Institutional studies across disciplinary barriers.
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1. Hodgson: An institution
1.1. It is difficult to know if  Geoffrey Martin Hodgson could ever have 
imagined becoming an institution himself. Only someone or something 
like an institution can be worthy of  Fest – ‘Celebration’, ‘Memorial’, ‘Hon-
or’, ‘Dedication’. We are talking about a Festschrift: Institutions and Evolution 
of  Capitalism. Essays in Honor of  Geoffrey M. Hodgson, edited by Francesca 
Gagliardi and David Gindis (Gagliardi and Gindis 2019a), two former PhD 
students of  Hodgson – to whom they dedicated the book.
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Hodgson is a scholar who has reflected a lifetime on the role, meaning 
and importance of  institutions in and for the economy, who in turn has 
created ‘Institutions’, such as the WINIR (World Interdisciplinary Network 
for Institutional Research) and the Journal of  Institutional Economics, dedi-
cated to the development and dissemination of  thought. Perhaps due to a 
strange performative effect of  Hodgson’s famous definition of  Institutions 
(2006), or as an unintended effect of  his action and thought, he happened 
to create a certain ‘shared habit of  thought’, at least in the University or 
‘Corporation’ of  academics that can be considered one of  the longest-lived 
institutions in history, after the Church.
Nevertheless, and again, it is difficult to know if  Hodgson could have 
ever imagined that the ‘reflexivity’ of  his thought could ‘flex’ to the point 
of  falling on him.
What we do know for sure, however, is that he could not have imagined 
that the curatori (‘editors’) were preparing this Festschrift with great cura 
(‘care’) 1 and well in advance, so that the book’s flyer was ready as a gift and 
surprise for a very special Fest: his seventieth birthday.2
1.2. The ‘Corporation’ of  academics who joined the editors in this en-
gaging intellectual enterprise is made up of  world-leading scholars f rom 
fields that have played a significant role in influencing Hodgson’s thought 
or represent key debates to which he has contributed. This book features 
original contributions from them, reflecting and shedding new light on 
key aspects of  Hodgson’s thinking: institutional economics, evolutionary 
economics, economic methodology, the history of  economic thought and 
social theory. The book is organized around the recurring themes of  insti-
tutions, evolution and capitalism.
It is a vital read for all those interested in such themes, heterodox econo-
mists, scholars looking for interdisciplinary approaches to institutions, and 
anyone eager to learn or improve their understanding of  current theory.
1.3. In section 2 of  this review essay, we will first provide a summary 
of  the contributions to the book and, at the same time, we will try to ex-
plain how they are placed in the vast horizon of  Hodgson’s thinking and/
or how contributors engage with it. Then, in section 3, we will hazard a few 
conclusive thoughts drawing inspiration from Hodgson’s reflections – in 
the last chapter of  the book – on the problematic economic conception of  
1 In Italian, the expression “A cura di” (‘Edited by’) carries the nuances of  ‘caring’ and 
‘taking care of ’.
2 We thank Francesca Gagliardi and David Gindis for having told us the book’s ‘backstory’.
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man and its connections with rule-following behavior, together with the 
problem of  moral, legal and political obligation and their relationship with 
freedom. We will also address the developments of  legal institutionalism 
and the future of  interdisciplinary studies on institutions more generally.
2. Institutions, evolution and capitalism: a reading guide
2.1. The first part of  the book, “Introduction”, opens with the essay en-
titled “Institutions and evolution of  capitalism in Geoff Hodgson’s work” 
(Chapter 1) by Gagliardi and Gindis (2019). The introductory chapter aims 
mainly to explain the meaning of  the celebration of  Geoff Hodgson, pres-
ent the themes around which the book is organized, and provide a sum-
mary of  the various contributions to the Festschrift.
2.2. Part II deals with “Foundations”. This title refers to the founda-
tions of  institutional economics in Hodgson’s perspective. His work has 
contributed significantly to re-founding the discipline, discussing its current 
state and the chances for the future. In this regard, ever since his Economics 
and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics (Hodgson 
1988), if  not earlier, Hodgson’s main publications have touched upon sev-
eral of  the discipline’s methodological and epistemological foundations. 
These works include Darwin’s conjecture: The search for general principles of  
social and economic evolution (Hodgson 2010), How Economics Forgot History 
(Hodgson 2001), and Economics and Evolution: Bringing Life Back into Econom-
ics (Hodgson 1993a).
The second part of  the book opens with Sheila Dow’s essay (2019) on 
“Geoff Hodgson on pluralism and historical specificity” (Chapter 1). Hu-
man history has produced a variety of  socio-economic systems. Given this 
indisputable historical and geographical variety, what legitimacy does the 
search for universal explanations and even universal methods have? How 
much generalization can we afford? These are old but never dormant philo-
sophical and methodological questions, and are, in many respects, funda-
mental for the birth of  Old Institutional Economics, to which Hodgson 
himself  has dedicated many works, helping reinvigorate the debate. Dow 
focuses in particular on two of  Hodgson’s fundamental contributions: his 
advocacy of  pluralism (Hodgson 1997) and his concern with historical spec-
ificity (Hodgson 2001). Hodgson’s argument for specificity – which relies 
on a pluralist ontology – and the corresponding critique of  excessive gen-
eralization do not entail denying generalization as such, and even less an 
endorsement of  the postmodernism credo that ‘anything goes’. Economic 
explanations must rest on a combination of  general and specific theories. 
ANGELA AMBROSINO – PAOLO SILVESTRI332
Dow then considers Hodgson’s advocacy of  methodological pluralism as 
based on an open-system ontology and a corresponding open system of  
knowledge. Such methodological pluralism, in connection with Hodgson’s 
reading of  Peirce’s abductive methodology, is seen as fostering a range of  
approaches, which, in turn, foster new ideas for explanatory hypotheses.
In his “Mathematical modelling in economics: seeking a rationale” 
(Chapter 3), Tony Lawson (2019) welcomes Geoff Hodgson’s (2012, 2013a) 
call for greater engagement and discussion among opposed opinions on 
the ability of  mathematical economic models to explain reality, as well as to 
better inquire into “the inadequately explored middle ground between the 
unacceptable extremes of  unreflecting worship and (at least expectational) 
denial of  formal models and methods” (Hodgson, 2009a: 186). Lawson be-
longs to the ‘skeptical’ side of  this spectrum of  positions, and in this chap-
ter he takes up some theses that have long distinguished him in this debate. 
Much of  the methodological debate on the nature and usefulness of  math-
ematical models in the economic sciences has focused on the problem of  
‘how’ models, however unrealistic or based on false assumptions they may 
be, can provide explanations on causal relationships in the real world. How-
ever, these debates, questioning (only) the ‘how’ and not the ‘whether’, 
take for granted “that mathematical modeling does add to understanding” 
(Lawson 2019: 30). Lawson questions this assumption, arguing that “social 
reality is in a specific sense open, whereas methods of  mathematical mod-
elling are relevant only where closures of  a corresponding sort occur or can 
be contrived. As such, mathematical modelling activities seem ill-suited to 
social analysis” (ibid.)
‘Nature’ and ‘Economy’ as well as their respective ‘characters’, Natural 
Sciences and Economic Sciences, have been married for centuries, and their 
relationship is far from over, as some believe. The way their story is usu-
ally told brings to mind the way the relationship between God and man is 
narrated in some versions of  ‘secularization’. One day ‘someone’ declared: 
“God is dead”. The problem with this story is that God, far from being 
dead, continues to reappear in disguise almost everywhere. Philip Mirows-
ki (2019), in “Dissembling nature, elusive economy” (Chapter 4) provides 
a historical-epistemological account of  the relation between ‘Nature’ and 
‘Economy’. Those who claim that economics underwent a process of  de-
naturalization in the second half  of  the nineteenth century following the 
breakdown of  the theological conception of  nature are wrong. “In eco-
nomics, appropriations from the natural sciences did not screech to a halt 
around 1890; rather, models from Nature kept cascading throughout eco-
nomics down to the present day” (ibid.: 47). Econophysics, neuroeconom-
ics, evolutionary game theory are just a few examples of  what should by 
contrast be called a real process of  re-naturalization of  economics. Though 
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“the very content of  the terms ‘Economy’ and ‘Nature’ change drastically 
over time […] it seems they have been jointly defining one another over 
centuries, in ways that become nearly impossible to prise apart” (ibid.: 47).
In “The rest of  the resume: Veblen’s teaching and service activities” 
(Chapter 5), Charles Camic (2019) offers an intriguing narrative about the 
genesis and growth of  Veblen’s theory by reconsidering both the content of  
his teaching and his service activities, with particular reference to his role 
as editor of  the Journal of  Political Economy. This chapter refutes the com-
monly held idea that investigating teaching and services is not needed in 
order to understand our predecessors’ contributions to economics. Camic’s 
investigation shows that Veblen includes the very same issues he was writ-
ing and thinking about in all his daily activities: in the courses he taught, in 
the scientific direction of  JPE ( Journal of  Political Economy), and in his in-
teraction with colleagues and students. Though this paper does not set out 
to discuss any particular aspect of  Veblen’s thinking, it undoubtedly puts 
paid to the common idea that Veblen was an academic recluse, isolated 
from his colleagues and remote from his students, and it presents him as an 
active member of  his community. Camic’s reading, therefore, offers a more 
complete picture of  the founder of  the Old Institutional School, as active 
in the world he was writing about; second, it suggests that any scholar’s 
contribution would be better understood if  her studies and writings are 
investigated along with her teaching and service activities.
In his chapter on “Hodgson, cumulative causation and reflexive eco-
nomic agents” (Chapter 6), John Davis (2019) starts from Hodgson’s critique 
of  methodological individualism and its nexus with the Veblenian concep-
tion of  individuals as evolving sets of  habits as well as with the Veblenian 
agency-structure reasoning (Hodgson 1998, 2007, 2010). By drawing on 
this nexus of  critique and concepts, Davis provides an account of  what in-
dividuals must be in evolutionary settings that are explained in Veblenian 
cumulative causation terms and characterizes such agents as reflexive eco-
nomic agents. In turn, by contrasting this type of  agent with the standard 
expected utility agent conception, he argues that “in a cumulative causation 
world” – reframed by Davis in terms of  both linear and circular causal rela-
tion – “the standard conception fails to explain choice behavior, its principle 
goal, whereas reflexive agent conceptions offer an adequate explanation of  
choice behavior appropriate to evolving worlds” (Davis 2009: 78).
2.3. Part iii is devoted to “Institutional Economics” and includes essays 
that reflect on both Original Institutional Economics and New Institutional 
Economics. Hodgson has made a signal contribution to developing a mod-
ern and critical institutionalism that takes up Old Institutional Econom-
ics in the Veblenian tradition and expands its boundaries in dialogue with 
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other disciplines, in such works as his Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto 
for a Modern Institutional Economics (Hodgson 1988) and The Evolution of  In-
stitutional Economics: Agency, Structure and Darwinism in American Institution-
alism (Hodgson 2004).
Part iii opens with “Bridging Original and New Institutional Econom-
ics?” (Chapter 7) by John Groenewegen (2019). This paper takes its cue 
from Hodgson’s long discussion (dating back to 1988 but carrying on until 
the present) about the possibility or impossibility of  building bridges be-
tween OIE and NIE. In line with Hodgson’s view, Groenewegen argues that 
substantial differences still remain between the various approaches to insti-
tutional economics. He describes these different approaches as lying along 
a continuum where different schools are often useful complements and can 
learn from each other (ibid.: 93). Differentiating between OIE and NIE, he 
says, is no longer useful at this point. We should focus on specific issues of  
interest for an institutionalist economist and have an open debate about the 
appropriateness of  the different institutional theories. Groenewegen urges 
us to evaluate how well existing theories fit particular issues, as well as to 
question whether theories can be extended or replaced by new ones.
Claude Ménard (2019), in “Dimensionalizing institutions” (Chapter 8), 
reflects on the identities and differences between Hodgson and the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE). He puts forward two basic claims. First, 
although there are differences between Hodgson and the institutionalism 
associated with the Coase-North-Williamson tradition, Menard maintains 
that a comparison of  Hodgson’s definitions of  institutions, markets and 
firms with those developed recently in this tradition shows that they have 
to do not so much with fundamental disagreements on substance, but 
rather with Hodgson’s differentiation strategy. Nonetheless, and secondly, 
one fundamental disagreement remains: it involves “Hodgson’s (2002) “re-
jection of  the idea that “hybrids” are a class of  organizations in their own 
right, and his neglect of  the existence of  and need for intermediate institu-
tions” (Ménard 2019: 122). Menard defines such “mesoinstitutions” as “sub-
sidiary, intermediate institutional arrangements with a domain of  action 
defined by general rules established at the macroinstitutional level and in 
charge of  translating them into rules specific to a sector, a region, a type of  
activity, through identifiable mechanisms of  implementation and control” 
(ibid.: 121). According to Menard, Hodgson’s framework, because of  this 
neglect of  mesoinstitutions, provides a somewhat amputated picture of  
what modern capitalist systems are and how they work.
Among his various contributions to institutional economics, Hodgson 
has also provided insights into the theory of  the firm, insisting, in particu-
lar, on the importance of  the legal nature of  the firm, and, in general, on 
the constitutive role of  law for capitalism. Building on some of  this work 
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(Hodgson, 2002, 2009b, 2015; Deakin et al. 2017), Simon Deakin’s (2019) 
“Juridical ontology and the theory of  the firm” (Chapter 9) provides an un-
derstanding of  the nature of  the corporation by exploring the ontology of  
the legal system. Deakin shows how and why the study of  the patterns of  
legal thought or dogmatic legal knowledge – such as the concepts lawyers 
use to denote the firm in corporate law – can reveal aspects of  economic 
institutions that are otherwise hard to grasp. In turn they also reveal some-
thing about the nature of  law itself. More in particular, Deakin shows that 
the “evolution of  juridical forms such as the corporation” is “the result of  
two conflicting pressures: on the one hand, to maintain internal consis-
tency of  legal thought, and on the other, to adjust the law to a changing 
external environment” (ibid.: 139). In this connection, the gradual recogni-
tion of  various forms of  entity shielding and the assignment of  legal per-
sonality to durable, self-governing associational arrangements were driven 
not only by the long process of  industrialization, but also by law’s need to 
maintain internal, self-referential consistency, “without which the legal sys-
tem would dissolve into a mass of  undifferentiated commands” (ibid.: 139).
In “The corporation is not a nexus of  contracts: it’s an iPhone” (Chap-
ter 10), Richard Langlois (2019) discusses the nature of  corporations. This 
is one of  the oldest issues in legal theory, and NIE contributed extensively 
to the discussion by claiming that the corporation is a form of  cooperation 
among rights-holding individuals. By addressing the distinction between 
rights in personam (created by contracts) and rights in rem (created by law), 
the author moves away from the traditional description of  the corporation 
as a set of  contracts and suggests that a bottom-up theory of  the corporate 
entity is still possible if  we consider it as a right in rem that can be held by 
individuals (ibid.: 146). The idea is that the corporation is a mechanism 
through which owners exercise their rights. In this connection, corpora-
tions are far more complex forms of  ownership than the Coasean tradition 
in Law and Economics argued, just as “an iPhone is a far more complicated 
device than a single-purpose cellphone” (ibid.: 152). This paper is an impor-
tant step towards increasing dialogue between the analysis of  economic 
institutions and legal categories and concepts.
In some of  his recent contributions to the theory of  property rights, 
Hodgson (2015a, 2015b) has claimed that economists have often confused 
possession with property and that capitalism can only be understood if  we 
accept that, unlike possession, property is a social construct and a relation 
among individuals (Hodgson 2015c). Ugo Pagano (2019), in his “Property, 
possession and knowledge” (Chapter 11), develops these claims in new di-
rections. The view that the struggle for possession can evolve into property 
has usually been explained by resorting to evolutionary game theory. Pa-
gano’s basic claim is that this view is unwarranted without a collective defi-
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nition and enforcement of  what is considered legitimate possession. This 
is even truer in the modern knowledge economy, where “intellectual prop-
erty rights are sophisticated constructs of  modern law. They cannot evolve 
from possession struggles because the possession of  knowledge does not 
require the exclusion of  others” (ibid.: 158). The case of  intellectual proper-
ty rights and the analysis of  knowledge as a non-rival good lead Pagano to a 
second fundamental claim: “property rights do not only favor uncontested 
possession of  rival goods, they can also define intangible things limiting the 
universal possession of  non-rival goods” (ibid.: 159).
In “Near misses – a capitalist aborted take-off and a no-show: the Unit-
ed Provinces and Ming China” (Chapter 12), Andrew Tylecote (2019) takes 
Hodgson’s (2015) six-condition definition of  capitalism and compares the 
different path of  transformation into capitalism of  the Anglo and Dutch 
economies and China in the transition between the Ming and early Qing 
Dynasties. Tylecote’s paper is particularly intriguing, as it shows that in 
both cases there were some historical factors that constrained capitalism. 
Through the use of  history as a laboratory (Tylecote 2019: 179), the author 
substantiates the idea that the definition of  capitalism is not a simplify-
ing assumption, and the use of  a general definition does not permit us to 
ignore important features of  the context that are not included in the defi-
nition (Hodgson, 2016). Tylecote’s comparison leads him to argue that in 
both Europe and China the lack of  a unified home market mattered, but 
was due to different historical factors. The nature of  capitalism is an exam-
ple of  the importance of  historical specificity in Hodgson’s approach. As 
he himself  states in the last chapter of  this book, “general considerations 
about all human societies cannot tell us anything specific about different 
forms of  human society or different culture” (Gagliardi, Gindis, Hodgson 
2019: 340).
The third part of  the book concludes with “Institutions are neither au-
tistic maximizers nor flocks of  birds: self-organization, power and learn-
ing in human organizations” (Chapter 13), by Dosi, Marengo and Nuvolari 
(2019). In the authors’ intentions, it is more an outline of  a research pro-
gram than a research article. They aim to build common ground between 
the two “extreme boundaries” of  the modern interpretations of  the ‘primi-
tives’ constituting the social fabrics of  economic systems: on the one side, 
“nearly theological axiomatizations about human behaviour derived from 
simple invariant principles” and, on the opposite side, “purely ‘function-
alist’ or holistic theories of  collective dynamics” (ibid.: 194). The ‘primi-
tives’ are either individuals or institutions: either institutions are derived 
from the choices of  rational individuals with well-defined preferences, or 
individuals, including their choices, preferences and rationality, are derived 
from institutions. Similar ‘extreme’ explanations also exist for such key con-
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cepts as power, authority and hierarchies, and range from the ‘economic’ 
or ‘exchange view’ of  interactions and organizations to the ‘political view’. 
Such extremes are, almost by definition, reductionist, even though there 
are elements of  truth in both perspectives. Hence the need for a research 
program establishing common ground between them: a research program 
inspired by “such founding fathers such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, John 
Dewey, Max Weber, Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, all the way to 
Albert Hirschman, Herbert Simon, and a few others, recently rejuvenated 
by a generation of  scholars featuring, among the prominent ones, Geoff 
Hodgson” (ibid: 207).
2.4. Part iv of  the book is dedicated to essays on Evolutionary Econom-
ics. Hodgson sheds light on the overlap between Institutional Economics 
and Evolutionary Economics on many occasions, also calling for greater 
integration between the two approaches: see, among other publications, 
Evolution and Institutions: On Evolutionary Economics and the Evolution of  Eco-
nomics (Hodgson 1999), “Introduction to the special issue on the future of  
institutional and evolutionary economics” (Hodgson and Stoelhorst 2014), 
and “On fuzzy frontiers and fragmented foundations: Some reflections on 
the original and new institutional economics” (Hodgson 2014).
In “Industry and Trade: Marshall’s magnificent dynamics” (Chapter 14), 
Stanley Metcalfe (2019) starts from Hodgson’s (1993b, 2005) contribu-
tions depicting Alfred Marshall as an evolutionary economist but, unlike 
Hodgson, who demonstrates the prevalence of  Herbert Spencer’s influ-
ence on Marshall’s evolutionary scheme, Metcalfe suggests that Marshall’s 
evolutionary dimension can be “equate to a variation-cum-selection mode 
of  economic evolutionary reasoning” (Metcalfe 2019: 215). Metcalfe’s ar-
gument is based on Marshall’s notion of  the representative firm and an 
analysis of  his work on knowledge and innovation. Economies are evolv-
ing systems because they are based on knowledge that is an open evolving 
system. Hence, Metcalfe concludes, the organization of  science and tech-
nology and the organization of  economic activity are subject to the same 
principle: the prevailing order is the incubator of  what can be next.
In “Generalized Darwinism, the nature of  selection and market efficien-
cy” (Chapter 15), Jan Willem Stoelhorst (2019) turns to Hodgson’s (2002, 
2003) contributions on Generalized Darwinism, i.e., the idea that the social 
and the biological worlds share abstract features, especially captured by the 
concepts of  replication and selection. There is a substantial agreement over 
the idea that Generalized Darwinism does not imply that evolution in the 
social and in the biological spheres are similar in a substantive sense. Nev-
ertheless, as Aldrich et al. (2008: 581) suggest, “proponents of  generalized 
Darwinism still disagree over many subsidiary points, including aspects of  
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the precise definitions of  replication and selection”. In this paper, Stoel-
horst contributes to the discussion on the nature of  the concept of  selec-
tion by positing three types of  selection mechanism: ‘scarcity selection’, 
‘preference selection’ and ‘multi-level selection’. Despite the fact that the 
literature has mainly centered on ‘scarcity selection’, the author suggests 
that the latter two types are equally relevant to understanding evolution 
in social systems. He focuses on the mechanism of  ‘preference selection’, 
i.e., the transposition of  the concept of  ‘sexual selection’ Darwin used to 
explain the evolution of  ‘wasteful’ traits that in the biological world evolve 
despite the fact that they undermine survival selection (Stoelhorst 2019: 
235). Stoelhorst applies the causal logic of  ‘sexual selection’ to the evolu-
tion of  firms, showing that firms’ survival also depends on the ability to at-
tract members with heterogeneous preferences, and hence undermines the 
efficiency of  the market. This argument makes it possible to reject Milton 
Friedman’s idea that selection in the market warrants the assumption of  
profit maximization (ibid.: 244).
Vanberg’s (2019) essay  – “Cultural evolution, group selection and 
downward causation” (Chapter 16) – is an attempt to revive an old unfin-
ished debate with Hodgson (Vanberg 1986; Hodgson 1991) and to seek a 
reconciliation between Hayek’s methodological individualism and group-
selection theory. Vanberg focuses on the role that group selection plays 
in cultural evolution and in the propagation of  rules of  conduct, and on 
whether group selection can explain the evolution of  group-beneficial but 
individually costly practices. To this end, he applies the analytical tools of  
‘multi-level selection’ and ‘downward causation’. In the social world, selec-
tion takes place at multiple levels, with the selection forces at higher levels 
imposing constraints on and affecting what occurs at lower levels. Such a 
social world is made up of  multiple constitutional levels. Downward causa-
tion explains how higher levels – the constitutional constraints – influence 
lower levels, down to the level of  individual actions. Nevertheless, upward 
causation, originating in individual actions, remains the ultimate driving 
force in the inclusive hierarchy of  social organizational levels.
Hodgson and Jack Vromen were among the early promoters of  the in-
troduction of  evolutionary ideas into economics, though their ideas have 
diverged more recently. In “Generalized Darwinism, routines and moral-
ity” (Chapter 17), Vromen (2019) complements his early critique of  Hodg-
son’s idea of  Generalized Darwinism and homes in on two main issues: 
Hodgson’s (2009c) attempt to give an unequivocal meaning to firm’s rou-
tines, and his discussion of  the role of  moral motivation in economic the-
ory. While Hodgson argues that evolutionary theory can explain both the 
role of  routines inside firms and moral motivation, Vromen, on the other 
side, argues that evolutionary theory is ill-equipped to explain these phe-
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nomena and claims that several distinct sorts of  explanation are desirable: 
evolutionary explanation and proximate explanation should mutually in-
form each other. Vromen does not suggest a further disciplinary fragmen-
tation promoting complete isolation among disciplines. He simply argues 
that evolutionary theory cannot have primacy over others, and should not 
jeopardize different disciplines with the aim of  providing a unique explana-
tory framework.
In “The ubiquity of  habits and routines and their contribution to man-
agement theory” (Chapter 18), Markus C. Becker (2019) investigates the 
influence of  Hodgson’s contribution on the role of  habits and routines in 
human activity on management theory (Hodgson 1988, 1993, 1999). The 
behavioral theory of  the firm has emphasized the pervasiveness of  rules 
and standard procedures in firm theory, but despite the increasing number 
of  theoretical and empirical investigations of  habit and routine in organi-
zations, Hodgson’s work still has an unexploited potential for furthering 
management theory. After a short review of  Hodgson’s thinking on habit 
and routines, Becker performs a citation analysis on management journals 
to investigate the extent to which Hodgson’s ideas have been used in man-
agement theory. Though he finds that Hodgson’s ideas have had a certain 
impact in the discipline, Becker concludes that a habit-based conception of  
human agency in the light of  Hodgson’s work should improve the under-
standing of  phenomena involving behavioral inertia. Specifically, he refers 
to: 1. individual-level behavioral inertia, 2. organization-level behavioral 
inertia. Habits are the main drivers of  resistance to change in individual 
behavior and are also responsible for the development of  organizational 
routines. But Hodgson’s work shows that habits are not only a source of  
resistance, they also maintain institutions and influence how institutions, 
in turn, shape habits (Becker 2019: 293). This provides a more complex ex-
planatory view of  change in individual behavior and organizations.
In “The role of  selection processes in organizational evolution” (Chap-
ter 19), Thorbjorn Knudsen (2019) investigates the operation of  selection 
processes in organizations. The evolutionary perspective in management 
theory has mainly focused on processes of  organizational search, learning 
and adaptation, while the study of  selection processes has been widely ne-
glected. Knudsen explores how selection processes influence the evolution 
of  organizational productivity and fitness over time. The importance of  
such processes in organizational evolution has been pointed out by Hodg-
son and Knudsen (2010) and Hodgson (2013b). Here Knudsen proposes a 
series of  experiments illustrating how the nature of  selection processes and 
selection pressure determine the population-wide level of  productivity and 
fitness over time. This model allows Knudsen to argue that neglecting the 
study of  selection processes could have unfortunate consequences on the 
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development of  organizational theory because our understanding of  or-
ganizational evolution could become myopic if  adaptation and learning 
are studied at a time scale where the effect of  selection is invariant, and 
because causal effects could be misinterpreted as population level processes 
of  selection and firm level processes of  adaptation are often interrelated 
even at a short time-scale (Knudsen 2019: 299).
Despite the successes of  Modern Evolutionary Economics, it has been, 
and still is, empirically weak. It is mainly concerned with qualitative phe-
nomena – such as ideas and knowledge, usually conceptualized as generic 
rules, that make up an economic order. But how can the ‘qualitative’ be 
translated into quantifiable measures? In “Why is evolutionary economics 
not an empirical science?” (Chapter 20), Kurt Dopfer and Jason Potts (2019) 
provide a methodological framework whereby “refinement of  the transla-
tion between theoretical constructs and empirical measures” is possible. 
If  evolutionary economics must become an empirical science, this “does 
not mean that evolutionary economics needs to become per se a quantita-
tive science; rather it needs to develop – beside quantitative – qualitative 
measures; which […] can be constructed from a generic rule-based (that is, 
meso-centred) analytic approach” (ibid.: 316). This endeavour can be orga-
nized around “the micro-meso-macro analytical framework in which the 
basic empirical measures are the various dimensions of  a meso unit (het-
erogeneity, variety, frequency). The generic taxonomy of  orders, classes 
and phases of  a rule provides the architecture for developing a comprehen-
sive map of  the measure space of  an evolving economy” (ibid.: 324).
2.5. The last word to Hodgson. In part five, “Hodgson on Hodgson”, 
the editors of  the volume have rightly thought of  concluding the volume 
with “A conversation with Geoff Hodgson” (Chapter 21) (Gagliardi, Gindis, 
Hodgson 2019). It is, however, much more than a simple interview. It is a 
conversation that gives Hodgson the opportunity to take stock of  some re-
curring themes of  his thought and to look ahead. The topics touched upon 
include Hodgson’s profound disagreement with the unfalsifiable model of  
the utility maximizing agent and his call for a better understanding of  hu-
mans and their motivations that is consistent with evolutionary accounts, 
the distinction between moral norms and conventions, moral motivations 
and convenience, and the related distinction between different kinds of, and 
reasons for, rule-following behavior. The discussion also ranges from the 
strengths and weaknesses of  interdisciplinarity, to an assessment of  the pres-
ent position of  heterodox economics, and thence from legal institutionalism 
to other methodological issues such as the problem of  historical specificity. 
The chapter closes with an overview of  the strategy of  the Journal of  Institu-
tional Economics and interdisciplinary institutional research more generally.
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3. Hodgson on Hodgson beyond Hodgson
It has rightly been noted that “Festschriften […] are not just retrospec-
tive, but prospective. […] the Festschrift is a Beruf, a call to further work, 
effort, and energy, a call to the improvement of  learning, of  a discipline, a 
science, an artistic vision, or an intellectual position” (Horowitz 1987: 237). 
If  we have understood the meaning of  this book well, we would like to 
take up this ‘call’ and focus on some aspects referred to by Hodgson in his 
attempt to look ahead.
The points we would like to address are Hodgson’s reflections linking 
the problematic economic conceptions of  man to rule-following behavior, 
together with the problem of  moral, legal and political obligation (and 
their relationship with freedom). In connection with these points, we will 
also focus on the developments of  legal institutionalism and the future of  
interdisciplinary studies on institutions more generally.
At various points in his interview, Hodgson insists on the importance 
of  a better understanding of  humans in order to develop a (so to speak) 
‘more humane’ social science: “we need to appreciate what is specifically 
human about our nature, our behaviour and our motivations, so that we 
have a better understanding of  the economy”. Therefore, “we need to 
introduce morality” (Gagliardi, Gindis and Hodgson 2019: 329) as well 
as other attributes like identity (ibid.: 332), “solidarity with others and fu-
ture generations” (ibid.: 343) and, we could also add, gift and gift-giving 
behaviors.3
If  social sciences continue to flirt with or submit to the fascination of  
the utility maximizing agent, we will never be capable of  providing an ad-
equate answer to two key questions: “why do people follow rules and, con-
versely, why on some occasions do they break rules?” (ibid.: 333). There is 
no doubt that much of  New Institutional Economics and Economics more 
generally have remained stuck to the “MaxU” model and that we need a 
better “Humanomics” (McCloskey 2015).
If  we focus simply on costs and benefits, that is, on material or monetary car-
rots and sticks to get people to follow the rules involved, we leave something out. 
We miss key components of  any well-functioning society, because we fail to see 
just how much societies depend on moral rules […]. I think this is where the study 
of  how institutions work in their varied ways, and how people are motivated to 
3 On this see the contributions to the Symposium “On Institutional Analysis and the Gift” 
recently published in the Journal of  Institutional Economics: Kesting et al. 2020, Elder-Vass 
2020, Cedrini et al. 2020, Hudik and Fang 2020, Taylor and Goodman 2020 and Goodman and 
Herzberg 2020.
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follow rules, is extremely valuable and helpful in practical terms (Gagliardi, Gindis 
and Hodgson 2019: 334).
Hodgson’s two questions are not only the right starting point for an 
understanding of  rule following behaviors: they are also key ‘human’ is-
sues. It is also (and always) from there that every generation, or rather we 
as scholars and citizens, must start (or start again) every time we are faced 
with the problem of  an adequate understanding of  the human and, more 
particularly, of  the relationship between obligation and freedom. It would 
seem that institutional economics has been more interested in the ‘norm’ – 
perhaps because of  the search for explanations based on uniformity and 
regularity, perhaps because of  a certain neglect of  the theme of  human 
freedom – than in the ‘exception’, that is, the first of  Hodgson’s two ques-
tions – why do people follow rules? In any case, the answers have not been 
satisfactory, partly as a result of  an inadequate understanding of  the role 
played by law (ibid.: 342) and, more generally, of  the problem of  legal, po-
litical and moral obligation. The legal, the political and the moral fade into 
each other, especially when it comes to the ultimate normative foundation 
of  institutions of  large and “well-functioning societies”. Such institutions 
must rest on a shared sense of  “community” and “identity”, be it through 
a “nation-building” process (ibid.: 335) and/or, we could also add, through 
collective rituals, public celebrations of  a collective memory, public fests.
The always problematic tension between obligation and freedom, if  
we are not mistaken, is an issue dear to Hodgson. He discussed it in his 
now-famous article “What are Institutions?” (Hodgson 2006), criticizing 
the reductionist Northian conception of  institutions as ‘constraints’, which 
inevitably leads to a neglect of  the theme of  obligation and freedom. This 
is an issue to which Hodgson has also returned in an essay often quoted in 
this volume (Hodgson 2015a).
But the second question  – why on some occasions do people break 
rules? – has an even more fundamental anthropological meaning. It touch-
es on the great theme of  human freedom and dignity, at least since the days 
of  Antigone, whose story, not surprisingly, is made to coincide with the 
dawn of  the Western legal-philosophical tradition.
The neglect of  the role played by law, and the inadequate understand-
ing of  the problem of  legal-political obligation and its tension with free-
dom are rather paradoxical for an institutional economics that has made re-
flection on rules and norms its distinctive feature, and which often presents 
itself  as interdisciplinary, but only rarely cares to dialogue with scholars of  
law, philosophy of  law or politics.
Hodgson criticizes heterodox economists for being politically and 
ideologically oriented to the point that, despite presenting themselves as 
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“pluralists”, they often end up excluding dialogue with other scholars or 
approaches: “If  you choose to say, ‘we are pluralists’, you have to be very 
vigilant about inviting both mainstream people and heterodox people you 
might not like, such as Austrians” (ibid.: 346). One would think that this 
criticism could also be leveled against institutional economics.
In this regard, both Hodgson’s invitation to “multiple disciplinary un-
derstandings” of  the institutions through collaboration between scholars 
of  “law, social philosophy, philosophy of  social science and philosophy of  
economics”, and his hope that “the best contributions will come from peo-
ple who can talk across disciplinary barriers” (ibid.: 349) are very much wel-
comed. To be sure, Hodgson has already given an excellent example of  such 
collaboration in an article written with important legal scholars: “Legal insti-
tutionalism: Capitalism and the constitutive role of  law” (Deakin et al. 2017).
Hodgson’s work on legal institutionalism that explicitly makes legal 
scholars collaborate with economists is an example of  his continuous at-
tempt to force the social structure of  heterodox economics to open a dia-
logue with other disciplines. Hodgson enters into the debate on heterodox 
economics by investigating many key issues in order to contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of  institutions from a true pluralist perspective. Though 
he has always been a critic of  mainstream economics and has been involved 
in many heterodox networks, he has also pointed to problems within het-
erodoxy. Hodgson argues that heterodox economics shows the same fea-
tures of  any other social process, it consists of  habits and practices that are 
structured within institutions. Hence it is characterized by the existence of  
relations of  power and habits of  thought that help to determine its course 
of  development. As Kitcher (1993) suggests, relations of  power are needed 
to sustain and motivate the advancement of  research, and scientists in a dis-
cipline must arrive at a compromise with them while improving scientific 
reasoning.
Relations of  power like habits and practices in a discipline are (as is 
always the case in processes of  institutional change) the main forces driv-
ing changes but, at the same time, they also are the main obstacles to this 
evolutionary process.
In the interview, Hodgson takes the opportunity to return to some con-
siderations presented in his previous works about the possible development 
of  institutional economics (Hodgson and Stoelhorst 2014, Hodgson 2014) 
and perhaps to anticipate some of  the content of  “Heterodox economics 
as a scientific community: Problems, prospects and alternative strategies” 
(Hodgson 2019a) and Is There a Future for Heterodox Economics? Institutions, 
Ideology and a Scientific Community (Hodgson 2019b). He discusses the role 
of  ideology in economics and addresses several key problems facing a de-
sirable future scenario for social science.
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Hodgson stresses the role of  ideology in economics and in social sci-
ence, noting that since scholars are unavoidably motivated by their own 
values, this political or ideological motivation affects their judgment re-
garding methods, assumptions and so on. The ideological dimension of  
a discipline is also strongly linked to “the need to build up an empowered 
community of  scientists sharing some common assumptions and with 
some consensus on key issues” (Hodgson 2019a: 1). An ideology-free eco-
nomics is neither possible nor desirable (Hodgson 2019b: 6), while Hodg-
son warns that the ideological dimension of  heterodox economics would 
make critical development of  the discipline more difficult.
He thus suggests that focusing on the heterodox label relegates this 
branch of  economics to the dimension of  minority dissent. “Heterodox” is 
a negative definition rather than one that builds on positive ground (Hods-
gon 2019a). Here Hodgson highlights the real opportunity for a critical de-
velopment of  economics: in the near future scholars should somehow over-
come the juxtaposition between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in economics.
The real challenge in economics will be the ability to “talk across dis-
ciplinary barriers” (Hodgson 2019: 349), being aware that conversation be-
tween disciplines does not mean avoiding any ideological or political di-
mension of  economics and that it could be limited because people tend 
to stay in their own area of  specialization. Specialization is something we 
need to make science progress. As Polanyi (1962) suggested, both confor-
mity and innovation are indispensable in any science: in “order to be taken 
seriously, an investigation should largely conform to the currently predom-
inant beliefs about the nature of  things, while allowing that in order to be 
original it may to some extent go against these” (Polanyi 1962: 59).
Reading all the essays included in this book in the light of  Hodgson’s 
thought suggests that the editors traced a pathway guiding the readers 
through the different viewpoints and methodologies applied to some of  
Hodgson’s main topics of  interest. We believe this pathway could be par-
ticularly beneficial for scholars interested in economics’ internal debate and 
critical development. The influence of  Hodgson’s thought is evident in all 
of  these chapters. Regardless of  whether the contributors aim at pursuing 
Hodgson’s thinking or showing its limits, each of  them acknowledges the 
relevance of  his many ground-breaking works.
We will end with a ‘brace’ of  conclusions. The editors wrap up their 
introduction to the Festschrift as follows: “Like many others, we have been 
profoundly influenced by Hodgson, and owe him a debt of  gratitude. It is 
an honour to count him as a mentor and a friend”. In the conclusion of  the 
interview, Hodgson in turn reciprocates with a “Thank you for this won-
derful initiative in putting this Festschrift together. I am very honoured and 
very grateful”.
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These last words bring us to a final variation on the normative foun-
dation of  Institutions, where much work remains to be done. Debt and 
gratitude, obligation and freedom, sacrifice and gift, as well as their rituals 
(well beyond any conceivable economic calculation): these are the invisible 
foundations of  (good) institutions that hold (good) societies together. They 
are always worthy of  being honored and celebrated, even in a Fest.
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